[time-nuts] Beginner's time reference

[Charles P. Steinmetz]

Nigel wrote:

>Again though, it's the interval that we measure.  [In response to my 
>suggestion that, in theory, we could specify the interval since the 
>big bang and it would be "absolute" in a fairly robust sense, at 
>least in this universe.]

>Assigning conventional units to measurement is not a problem, it's 
>just that the units we assign to "time" measurement are always a 
>measure of  the intervals.  There's no problem with this either 
>until one starts to believe, as  many seem to do without due 
>consideration, that time itself is an absolute quantity.

>I agree it becomes more of a philosophical argument than is 
>sometimes comfortable, and more often than not perhaps a question of 
>etymology rather than ontology as we debate the meanings and 
>definitions of the words  we use to describe things, but I do think 
>it's important to stop and consider sometimes just what we do mean, 
>or what is implied, when we talk about  "time".

This is getting old, but I'll give it one more try.  What you allude 
to in the last paragraph above -- taking care to separate all 
semantic issues from genuine philosophical issues -- is, as I see it, 
the heart of this discussion.  And it appears to me that you are 
conflating semantic issues with genuine philosophical issues.

I think we all agree that intervals are what we measure.  The 
question is whether this has any bearing on whether "time is an 
absolute quantity," and if so, whether time being or not being an 
"absolute quantity" is philosophically interesting.  A number of us 
have been trying, without success, to get you to be more precise 
about what you mean by time "being [or not being] an absolute 
quantity," and how that might be important.  As it stands, you have 
not done so, so we are left to guess what meaning and import this 
phrase has in your view.

The two possibilities I see are that you mean (i) time has no 
ontological status -- that is, that it doesn't "really" exist, but is 
merely an imaginary construct that we impose on the universe; or (ii) 
even if time does have ontological status, it is not philosophically 
interesting unless it is "absolute" (whatever that means).

What a number of us have been saying is that the way we measure time 
is purely conventional (and therefore, I suppose, "imaginary"), but 
that accepting this says nothing about either of these two issues -- 
i.e., whether time really exists or whether it is philosophically interesting.

I take no position on the ontological status of time, but not because 
we measure it "only" in intervals or because it is not "absolute" 
(whatever that means).  Rather, for me, it is an issue whether time 
-- as one dimension of spacetime -- can be a separate ontological 
entity.  In my view, when Einstein, Dirac, Bohr, Lorentz, 
Schroedinger, and other "founding fathers" of modern physics spoke or 
wrote regarding the "existence" of time, this is the issue they were 
addressing.  However, if we accept that spacetime exists, nothing is 
really riding on whether time is a separate ontological entity -- it 
has ontological status as a constituent of spacetime.

So, the remaining question is whether the claim that time is not 
"absolute" (whatever that means) -- if true -- somehow renders the 
issue of time a merely semantic matter, or otherwise philosophically 
uninteresting.  I don't see how this could be, but then I cannot 
imagine what you mean by time not being absolute, other than it can 
"only" be measured by intervals, and you have not explained what you 
mean in any but the most vague and circular terms.

If you are able to articulate what it would be for time to be an 
absolute quantity, and how this would make a difference with respect 
to its ontological status or philosophical interest, I'll be happy to 
listen -- but I won't hold my breath.

Best regards,

Charles